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... If you were to sit as a juror in this case and
the jury were to convict the defendant of
capital murder, would you also be able to con-
sider voting for a sentence less than death?
47
The court concluded that these questions sufficed to
conduct the Wainwright inquiry as to the ability of the
prospective jurors to perform their duties in accordance
with their instructions and their oaths. 8 These questions
clearly were not designed to elicit complex, honest respons-
es from jurors but instead seem aimed at securing perfunc-
tory monosyllabic responses. Indeed, it seems that these
questions, in substance, are directed at nothing more than
determining"whether a juror can be fair, or follow the law,"
11d. Mackall's counsel was denied the opportunity to ques-
tion jurors as to their substantive views concerning the death
penalty. See supra note 40.
48Mackall II, 131 E3d at 451.
which the court deemed insufficient to make the constitu-
tionally required inquiry 9
Defense counsel in capital cases should strive to secure
the opportunity to conduct a meaningful voir dire, which
would encompass asking questions designed to engage the
prospective jurors in more honest, revealing conversations
about their views regarding the death penalty and thus
identify and exclude from the jury individuals whose views
would interfere with their abilities to perform their duties.
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual offers
suggestions and strategies for conducting a meaningful voir
dire.




130 F.3d 595 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Nearly twenty years ago, two cousins, John Plath and
JohnArnold,' and each of their girlfriends, Carol Ullman and
Cindy Sheets,2 decided to go on a search for wild mush-
rooms.' After borrowing a car and setting out on their expe-
dition, the group came upon Betty Gardner, a farm worker,
walking along the side of the road.4 After dropping Gardner
off at her brother's home,' the group, at Arnold's sugges-
tion," decided to go back and kill Gardner.
7
After picking up Gardner, they took her to a remote
wooded area near a garbage dump. There, all four in the
group, at one time or another, physically assaulted Gardner.8
Based on the testimony at trial, the court of appeals devel-
oped the following scenario of what took place at that
remote wooded area. Initially, Arnold knocked Gardner to
the ground, and he and Plath began kicking her.9 Then Plath
ordered Gardner to remove her clothes, and forced her to
'See Case Summary of Arnold, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p.7.
2The two cousins were in their twenties, and their girlfriends,
Ullman and Sheets, were eleven and seventeen years old respec-
tively.
3Plath v. Moore, 130 E3d 595, 597 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Arnold v.Evatt, 113 E3d 1352,1355 (4th Cir. 1997)).
4Plath, 130 E3d at 597 (citingArnold, 113 E3d at 1355).
'Gardner asked the group for a ride to work, but they refused.
6Arnold, 113 E3d at 1355.
7Plath, 130 E3d at 597 (citingArnold, 113 E3d at 1355).
8 ld. at 597.
9Id. at 597.
perform oral sex upon both himself and his girlfriend,
Sheets. While Gardner performed oral sex on Sheets, Plath
beat Gardner with a leather belt, and later urinated in
Gardner's mouth, forcing her to swallow the urine. 0
Plath and Arnold then unsuccessfully attempted to kill
Gardner by strangling her with part of a garden hose.After
this first effort failed, Plath continuously stomped on
Gardner's neck for a period of time, followed by his stab-
bing of her some ten times in the chest." Using the garden
hose, Arnold dragged Gardner by the neck into the nearby
wooded area. He returned to say that he did not think
Gardner was dead, whereby Plath told Sheets to cut
Gardner's throat with a broken bottle." Gardner finally died
after Sheets and Arnold strangled her a second time with
the hose.3
By jury trial, the South Carolina Court of General
Sessions convicted both Plath and Arnold of the kidnap-
ping, rape and murder of Gardner, and subsequently sen-
tenced both to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions, but reversed the death sentences,
'11d. at 597.
"According to testimony, at this point in the murder, Plath
commented that"niggers are sure hard to kil' Plath, 130 E3d at
597.
"Id. at 597.
'31d. at 597. Arnold attempted to mislead the police by carv-
ing "KKK" into Gardner's body. Nonetheless, Sheets led the police
to Gardner's decomposed body almost six weeks later.
"Id. at 597.
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and remanded the case for resentencing.'5 The second jury
recommended the death penalty, and the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed Plath's death sentence. 6 After the
United States Supreme Court denied Plath's writ of certio-
rari,' 7 he applied for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") in the
South Carolina Court of General Sessions. Following an evi-
dentiary hearing, the Court of General Sessions dismissed
Plath's PCR application on May 12,1986.8
Plath again applied for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, and this time the Court granted his appli-
cation. In light of Yates v. Evatt,'9 the Court remanded
Plath's case to the Court of General Sessions for reconsid-
eration of the issue of whether the implied malice instruc-
tion given at Plath's original trial" violated his right to due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, and, if so, whether that violation consti-
tuted reversible error.2' The Court of General Sessions held
that the implied malice instruction did not violateYates, and
that, even if it did, that violation was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.22
On March 5,1990, the Court of General Sessions denied
Plath's third amended PCR application.21 On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this denial, holding
that, although the implied malice instruction violated Yates,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.24 The United
States Supreme Court denied Plath certiorari on February
22,1993.5
Plath next petitioned for habeas relief in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina. The State
'5State v. Plath, 284 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. 1981).
'6State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619 (S.C. 1984).
'7Plath v. South Carolina, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984).
'8Plath v.Moore, 130 E3d 595,597 (4th Cir. 1997).
'9500 U.S. 391 (1971) (holding that implied malice instruction
was constitutional error subject to harmless-error analysis). Yates
explained that the reviewing court must only determine that the
erroneous instruction was unimportant in relation to the other
evidence which was considered by the jury, independently of the
erroneous presumption. Yates, 484 U.S. at 403. Under Yates, the
reviewing court must ask "what evidence the jury actually consid-
ered in reaching its verdict" and must "weigh the probative force
of that evidence against the probative force" of the erroneous pre-
sumption standing alone. Id. at 404.
2The trial court instructed the jury that murder is "the killing
of any person with malice aforethought either express or implied:
Furthermore, the trial court stated that malice may be expressed
"as where one makes previous threats of vengeance or where one
lies in wait or other circumstances which show directly that the
intent to kill was really entertained," or may"be implied from the
willful, deliberate and intentional doing of any unlawful act with-
out just cause or excuse, or from the use of a deadly weapon."
Arnold v. Evatt, 113 E3d 1352,1356 (4th Cir. 1997).
21 lath, 130 E3d at 597-98.
2Id. at 598.
23Plath first raised the claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel and lack of mental competence during the resentencing trial.
Id. at 601-02.
241d. at 598.
21Plath v. State, 507 U.S. 927 (1993).
moved for summary judgment, and on October 17, 1994, a
U.S. Magistrate recommended denial of habeas corpus relief.'
After granting the State's motion for summary judgment, the
district court denied habeas relief on September 3, 1996, and
denied Plath's motion to amend his PCR application on
January 30,1997.27 Plath appealed the denial of habeas relief.
HOIDING
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
affirmed the district court's denial of the writ of habeas cor-
pus, holding that (1) the unconstitutional implied malice
instruction was harmless error;' (2) defense counsel were
not ineffective;2 9 (3) the claim of alleged lack of mental
competence during resentencing trial was procedurally
barred;10 and (4) the absence of defense counsel from the
jury view of the site of the murders did not deprive peti-
tioner of effective assistance of counsel.
31
ANALYSIS/APPICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Implied Malice InstructionW2
Plath challenged the judge's implied malice instruction
as "clearly unconstitutional," and amounting to reversible
error.3 3 As it did in Arnold v. Evatt, the court applied the
two-part test from Yates v. EvatW5 to determine whether the
instruction "'had substantial and injurious effect or influ-
ence in determining the jury's verdict."' 3 The Yates test
involves: (1) "ask[ing] what evidence the jury actually con-
sidered in reaching its verdict;" and (2)"weigh[ing] the pro-
bative force of that evidence against the probative force of
the [implied malice] presumption standing alone*737
In applying the Yates test to the implied malice instruc-
tion in Plath, the court reiterated its conclusion in Arnold,
stating, "'this case reeks of express malice and any reason-
able jury, notwithstanding the implied malice instruction,
would have found malice beyond a reasonable doubt!"58
The court reasoned that the instruction in Plath's case was




"Plath, 130 E3d at 602.
3'Id. at 602-03.Although Plath raised this issue and the court
reviewed it, this issue will not be discussed in this case summary.
See Case Summary of Arnold, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 7.
32See Case Summary of Arnold, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No.1, p. 7 .
The State tried Plath and Arnold together so the analysis of the
implied malice instruction in the Case Summary of Arnold is
applicable to Plath also.
3
1lath, 130 E3d at 598.
14113 E3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997).
31500 U.S. 391 (1991).
"Arnold, 113 E3d at 1356 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619,637 (1993)).
37Yates, 500 U.S. at 404.
"Plath, 130 E3d at 598 (quoting Arnold v. Evatt, 113 E3d
1352, 1357 (1997)).
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the same as the one in Arnold's case, and because the
Arnold instruction was harmless error, then so was the
Plath instruction.39
Plath unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish his case
from Arnold's. He argued first that, unlike Arnold, there was
no "clear and independent evidence of malice" that could
be attributed to him.40 In rejecting this argument, the court
composed a list of Plath's malicious acts and commented
that as much, if not more, of the evidence of malice could
be credited to Plath.41
Furthermore, Plath argued that the lack of credibility of
Sheets (a key witness), the existence of exculpatory evi-
dence, and the State's use of the implied malice presump-
tion in its closing argument all went to rebutting the body
of evidence of malice against him.42 Again, the court
returned to Arnold, finding that such circumstances existed
in Arnold's case, but nonetheless it still found the instruc-
tion to be harmless error. Therefore, the court found that
the conclusion in Plath should be the same.
The court rejected much of Plath's claim on the
implied malice instruction by repeating its reasoning from
its Arnold decision. Nonetheless, capital defense counsel
can argue that the court should not have found the Arnold
instruction to be harmless error simply on the basis of
Plath because a determination of harmlessness is by defin-
ition, a fact-specific determination. In making future chal-
lenges to implied malice instructions, capital defense coun-
sel can utilize this requirement of fact-specific harmlessness
findings to distinguish both Plath andArnold. Furthermore,
the decision in Plath is a necessary reminder to capital
defense counsel that Yates offers a viable challenge to the
implied malice instruction and that this challenge should
always be made. When making such a challenge, capital
defense counsel should keep in mind that the defense bears
the burden of proof under the Yates analysis.
H. In Favorem Vitae Review
A. Background
Under in favorem vitae review, a court reviews "'the
entire record for legal error, and assumes error when unob-
jected-to but technically improper arguments, evidence,
jury charges, etc. are asserted by the defendant on appeal in
39Md. at 598.
0Id. at 599.
4"id. at 599.The court attributed the following malicious acts
to Plath: (1) compelling the victim to undress; (2) forcing the vic-
tim to perform oral sex upon him; (3) forcing the victim to per-
form oral sex upon someone else; (4) striking the victim with a
leather belt while she performed oral sex upon another person;
(5) dragging the victim by the neck with a leather belt; (6) urinat-
ing in the victim's mouth; (7) assisting in strangling the victim with
a rubber hose; (8) stabbing the victim; and (9) directing another
person to "finish off" the victim.
4zPlath, 130 E3d at 599.
a demand for reversal or a new trial.'"" This type of review
enables the appellate court to examine the record for error
regardless of whether the error was preserved by an objec-
tion.44 However, in Kornahrens v.Evatt,45 the South Carolina
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of in favorem vitae
review because the court could not determine whether the
state court had properly applied federal constitutional prin-
ciples or had even considered those issues at all.46 The
defendant in Kornahrens argued that in using in favorem
vitae review for all errors on direct appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court considered the three errors he did
not raise on appeal, and consequently the errors were not
procedurally defaulted.'The court dismissed this argument
in conjunction with its rejection of in favorem vitae review,
stating that to review effectively a state-court judgment, it
must be clear the state court addressed the federal consti-
tutional issue on the merits.
4 8
B. The "Re-rejection" of In Favorem Vitae Review
In challenging the State's improper arguments at both
the guilt and sentencing phases as violative of due process,
Plath attempted to utilize the in favorem vitae review doc-
trine to argue that these errors were preserved for habeas
review. 9 Plath acquiesced that these improper arguments
were not raised on direct appeal. However, he alleged that
they were examined at the state level because of the South
Carolina Supreme Court's practice of in favorem vitae
review.
Despite the fact that the court rejected this same argu-
ment inArnold," Plath again sought to distinguish his case.
First, the May 12, 1986 court order which dismissed Plath's
PCR application explicitly stated that the South Carolina
Supreme Court had conducted an in favorem vitae review
of the case.51 Second, at the time of Plath's appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court operated under a custom of
"'reviewing closing arguments in capital cases regardless of
whether an issued [sic] had been raised at trial or on
appeal'"52 The court rejected both of these grounds, stating
that it had declined to recognize such implied review for
habeas matters because in favorem vitae review provided
federal courts with inadequate records in their determina-
tions of whether state courts had considered federal con-
stitutional issues, and not because the review did not exist. 3
Therefore, the court concluded that as in Arnold, the issue
43Kornabrens v. Evatt, 66 E3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315,324 (S.C. 1991)).
,Kornahrens, 66 E3d at 1362.
41d. at 1350.
"Id. at 1362.
47 d. at 1362.
4sKornahrens, 66 F.3d at 1363.
Plath, 130 E3d at 599.
5Arnold, 113 E3d at 1357.
"Plath, 130 E3d at 599.
521d. at 599-600 (quoting Petitioner's Br. at 17 (citing State v.
Gilbert, 258 S.E.2d 890,894 (S.C. 1979))).
531d. at 600.
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of improper arguments was procedurally defaulted in
Plath's case. 4
Capital defense counsel should be aware of this "re-
rejection" of the in favorem vitae, or implied, review.
Furthermore, they should be on notice that the idea of an
issue being "implicit in" a review conducted by a state
court, and thereby not procedurally defaulted for federal
habeas, is not going to be accepted by the United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. The court's reiteration of
its rejection of in favorem vitae review clearly dictates this
inevitable conclusion.
5
MI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
In making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must meet the test outlined in Strickland v.
Washington,6 which requires a showing that counsel's
action was both professionally deficient and the cause of
prejudice to the defendant. 7 Plath's claim addressed three
instances of conduct by his attorney. First, Plath argued that
his attorneys' failure to object to the use of an immunity
agreement between the State and Cindy Sheets, the key wit-
ness for the prosecution, that mentioned Sheets submission
to a polygraph test satisfied the Strickland standard.
58
Secondly, Plath faulted counsel's failure to lay the proper
foundation to admit evidence of x-rays of his leg, broken
before the murder, which would have aided in rebutting
Sheets's testimony about Plath "stomping" the victim. 9 The
court dismissed both of these grounds as not prejudicial,
and therefore failing to meet the test under Strickland.
Specifically, the court found the first action to be part of the
defense counsel's "trial strategy," and the second action to
be not objectively unreasonable in light of the fact that
counsel presented other evidence of the broken leg.'4
As grounds for his third claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Plath cited his attorneys' failure to present addi-
tional mitigating evidence, in that his counsel should have
conducted a more thorough investigation into Plath's back-
ground and mental state.6' Plath argued that such addition-
al mitigating evidence would have persuaded a jury to
impose a life sentence instead of the death penalty.
Although the court conceded that Plath's brief drew a
"striking picture of Plath's tragic background and extreme-
ly unstable mental state;' it also found this ground to be
without merit.62 First, the issue was procedurally defaulted
because Plath did not raise it until his final motion to amend
his application for PCR.63 Moreover, the court found no
5Id. at 600.
"Mrginia does not have in favorem vitae review so this analy-
sis is specific to South Carolina.
56466 U.S. 668 (1984).
"Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.




62Plath, 130 E3d at 601.
611d. at 601.
showing of cause and prejudice or of a fundamental mis-
carriage of justice in order to override the procedural
default.
Second, the court reasoned that although defense coun-
sel did not thoroughly explore Plath's background and men-
tal state, they nevertheless conducted a reasonable exami-
nation.6 1 In determining such reasonableness, the court
noted that at least ten witnesses testified about Plath's back-
ground. Furthermore, the court found that when this miti-
gating evidence was compared to "the sheer magnitude of
the aggravating evidence against Plath" it could not fathom
how the omission of such mitigating evidence was prejudi-
cial.65 In referring to Strickland, the court in Plath stated
that"' [g]iven the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is
no reasonable probability that omitted evidence would
have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circum-
stances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and,
hence the sentence imposed.'" ' The court concluded that
the mitigating evidence was inadequate to shift the balance
for Plath after it had weighed the omitted evidence against
the evidence which was used to convict and sentence
him.
67
The court's rejection of the first two grounds of Plath's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim are reminders to cap-
ital defense counsel of how difficult the Strickland stan-
dard is to meet.68 The analysis of the third ground, the attor-
neys' failure to conduct a more extensive examination of
Plath's background and mental state, is also a lesson for cap-
ital defense counsel. Given the balancing test that the court
used to determine whether the omitted mitigating evidence
would have produced a different outcome, defense counsel
should be aware of the pitfalls of holding back mitigating
evidence. When the appellate court, and not a jury, balances
the probability of a different result by comparing the miti-
gating and aggravating factors, withheld mitigating evi-
dence may foreclose relief. Thus, counsel will rarely want to
exclude mitigating witnesses even when their testimony
may be cumulative.
IV. Waiver of Mental Competency Hearing
Plath also alleged that his lack of mental competency
during the resentencing trial violated his rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 The
court rejected this allegation, finding that the issue was pro-
cedurally barred because Plath did not raise it until his final
motion to amend his PCR application." Plath attempted to
rebut the presumption that his claim was procedurally
mId. at 601-02.651d. at 602.
66Plath, 130 E3d at 602.
671d. at 602.
6 8Te Plath court itself notes the difficulty of this standard,
stating that the examination of the attorney's conduct must be
quite deferential and the prejudice to the defendant very evident.
Id. at 601.
691d. at 602.
7 Plath, 130 E3d at 602.
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barred, pointing to a line of South Carolina Supreme Court
cases that have permitted the issue of competence to be
introduced during collateral, or PCR, proceedings.
7'
In response, the court rejected Plath's rebuttal attempt,
including the supporting cases, distinguishing between a
state court allowing the unraised issue to be included in a
PCR application, and a federal court deliberating it on
habeas review.72 Even in light of the cases cited by Plath, the
7'I. at 602.
72Id. at 602.
court refused to go beyond the limitations of habeas review
established by the principles of comity.This is yet another
example of the stringency of the Strickland standard, and
consequently evidence of the dire necessity of raising all
potential issues at trial in order to preserve them for appeal.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
SATCIER v. PRUETT
126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1997)'
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Around 7:00 p.m. on the evening of March 31, 1991,
Deborah Abel was riding her bicycle along a path which
runs parallel to Lee Highway in Arlington County, Virginia.
2
As she entered a relatively secluded area on the path, she
noticed an "unthreatening man" walking toward her as she
rode.3 As she passed this man, they made eye contact.4 Two
or three seconds later, the man grabbed Abel from behind,
knocked her eye-glasses off, pulled her off of her bicycle,
dragged her into a ditch along the path, and began beating
her about the face and head.5 In the ensuing struggle, the
man managed to pull her pants part way down.6 While Abel
was being assaulted, Mark Polemani was riding his bicycle
along the same stretch of path. Polemani observed a man,
who appeared to be punching the ground, kneeling just off
the path near a prone bicycle. 7 Polemani got off of his bicy-
cle and approached the man.As he did so, however, the man
grabbed Abel's purse and ran away. Polemani briefly chased
the man but eventually returned to assist Abel.
Abel and Polemani each gave the police a description
of Abel's attacker. Abel described him as "a stocky black
male between twenty-five and thirty years old, about 5'9" or
5'10" and 190 to 200 pounds" with a "short 'Afro' haircut"
and no facial scars.8 A police artist made a sketch based on
Abel's description. Polemani gave a similar description and
an "almost identical" sketch was drawn.9 Upon seeing both
'The United States Supreme Court denied Satcher's petition
for a writ of certiorari on December 2,1997.Satcber v.Pruett, 118
S.Ct. 595 (1997). Michael Satcher was executed by lethal injection
on December 9,1997.
2Satcher v.Pruett, 126 E3d 561,563 (4th Cir. 1997).




7Satche, 126 E3d at 564.
81d.
9 d.
sketches, Polemani commented that the sketch based on
Abel's description was "better."'0
On the same evening that Abel was attacked, Ann
Borghesani was attacked as she was walking along the same
stretch of path." Borghesani's partially nude body was dis-
covered shortly after 8:00 a.m. the next morning at the bot-
tom of a stairwell in anAir Force Association building locat-
ed alongside the bike path less than 100 yards from where
Abel was attacked. 2 Borghesani had been raped and
stabbed twenty-one times with a "sharp-tipped object." 3
Additionally, her purse and some of her jewelry were miss-
ing.' 4 A few days later, Borghesani's purse and Abel's purse
were found together in some bushes located about two
blocks from the Air Force Association building.
Michael Satcher was arrested five months later, on
August 18, 1990, for trying to attack three different women
along a different bike path in Arlington County that morn-
ing. 6 At the time of his arrest, Satcher, who is African-
American, was twenty-one years old, 5'6" tall, weighed 152
pounds, had short hair, and a facial scar.7 Satcher voluntari-
ly gave the police blood, hair, and saliva samples. 8 The blood
test revealed that Satcher's blood type, which occurs in
seven percent of the population, was the same type as the
'0Id. The descriptions given by Abel and Polemani differed
.somewhat" from Satcher's actual appearance. Id. at 564-65. See
infra note 17 and accompanying text.





"Satcher, 126 E3d at 564.
61 d
'71d. at 564. Satcher's actual appearance differed fromAbel and
Polemani's descriptions in four out of the six characteristics they
described. Satcher's age, height, weight and facial scar were all
inconsistent with their descriptions. The only portions of the
descriptions which fit Satcher were"black male" and"short.. .hair."
See, supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
18Id.
